By Prof Ijaz Khan
The killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO attack on a Mohmand border post last week is tragic, and it has made Pakistanis angry. But a sound policy cannot be made on the basis of sorrow or anger.
Policy responses should be not based on emotions, and it is especially not appropriate to whip up emotions as a tool of policy, not just on moral grounds, but also because it reduces maneuverability – an elementary factor of good policy.
Pakistan’s response to the incident includes stopping NATO/ISAF supplies to Afghanistan, asking the US to vacate the Shamsi airbase, reassessment of Pakistan-US relations, and a demand for an apology with an assurance such incidents will not occur again. This was followed by an announcement that Pakistan will not attend the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan.
What is Pakistan up to? Does it have a clear, calculated policy on how it will react? Is that policy a result of a serious debate? Who is the real author of this policy reaction? What does Pakistan want to achieve? What are the implications of this course of action? To what extent is Pakistan prepared to go?
What actually happened matters less than what is stated to have happened. It is what is stated that becomes the basis for policy. Often, what happens is stated in a way that will suit a policy that has already been made.
There is genuine anger in Pakistan, but the public frenzy that has been created for ideological, political or leverage purposes has limited Pakistan’s diplomatic maneuverability
Pakistan’s military and a number of its opinion makers state that the NATO raid was a calculated act and not a mistake. They say the raid was meant to pressure Pakistan. Reports in the US media claim the action was in self defence. But the truth may never be conclusively known.
The Americans have expressed sorrow at the loss of life but have not apologised. That means such action might be repeated in a similar situation in future.
Rahimullah Yousafzai, a veteran journalist not known for his anti-establishment views, has reported deaths of Afghan civilians, at other places on other occasions, as a result of artillery fire from the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. The truth about that will never be fully known either.
The anger of the man on the street is justified by what he hears, but serious analysts are also asking Pakistan to at least stay firm on the actions already taken and not accept any pressure from friends or other countries in this regard, including likely interventions from the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
If one reads between the lines, Pakistan’s all-weather friend China has also not come out clearly in support of Pakistani policy position. They have sympathised with Pakistan and condoled the death of its soldiers, something the US has expressed as well. They have called for respect for Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty without clearly calling the incident as a violation. They have demanded an enquiry, something which NATO has already announced. Several states have condoled the death of Pakistani troops or condemned the loss of life, but none has condemned the act itself.
The manner in which this issue is being handled has more consequences for domestic politics than foreign policy or security of the country
Pakistan continues to play on the US need for Pakistani support in the endgame in Afghanistan. The price Pakistan wants for its cooperation is not acceptable to America. Keeping in mind the asymmetrical relations, Pakistan must clearly calculate whether it is ready to suffer or is capable of suffering the diplomatic, economic and military consequences if matters get out of hand.
There is genuine anger in Pakistan, but the public frenzy that has been created for ideological, political or leverage purposes has limited Pakistan’s diplomatic maneuverability. Has Pakistan decided not to back out at any stage at all? Even if at some stage an enquiry reveals an explanation that is different from the ones given from both sides? Will it then be possible for Pakistan to change its stance? Only at the cost of reaction from the public that already feels betrayed because of similar moves in the past.
The manner in which this issue is being handled has more consequences for domestic politics than foreign policy or security of the country. The imbalance in civil-military relations is tilting further in favour of the military. The dilemma is that the civilian leadership is unable to do much about it. It was already on the back foot because of the memogate issue.
Pakistan must give diplomacy a chance. It needs to revise its position and wait for the result of an enquiry. Pakistan has lodged a strong diplomatic protest, which was the correct and appropriate response. But it must not risk becoming totally irrelevant to Afghanistan’s future.
Dr Ijaz Khan is a professor of International Relations at University of Peshawar, and author of the book ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Study of Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy’ published by Nova Publishers, New York.
